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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to explore the divergent views concerning the proper 
role o f religious convictions in moral-political justification. The basic question that 
guides this research is how far are American citizens, religious leaders, and elected 
officials properly guided in political choices based on religious convictions before they 
are acting unconstitutionally?
Selected writings o f John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey served to 
capture three moments in American intellectual history prior to World War Two. This 
was followed by the consideration of the divergent views o f moral-political philosophers 
expressed in the last twenty years.
The most important resource used to explore this issue was contained in the 
Supreme Court records involving obscenity law jurisprudence. The question was raised: 
did religious convictions influence or inform the judge’s decisions?
The results suggest there exists a great diversity o f opinion among moral-political 
philosophers and judges concerning the proper role of religious convictions in moral- 
political justification.
THE PROPER ROLE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTION 
IN MORAL-POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Introduction
This paper will explore divergent views concerning the proper role of religious 
convictions in moral-political justification. The basic question that guides this exposition 
is how far are American citizens, religious leaders, and elected officials properly guided 
in political choices based on religious convictions before they are acting 
unconstitutionally? Or, to borrow the words of Michael Perry1,1 will discuss “the proper 
relation of a person’s moral beliefs [based on religious convictions] to her political 
choices, and especially, to her public deliberation about her justification o f political 
choices (3).” Put specifically, in a liberal democracy, is it proper to politically enforce 
(by law) a person’s moral beliefs about what constitutes right action if those moral beliefs 
are based primarily upon religious convictions? And I raise this question inside the 
context of American histoiy and culture, our laws, our institutions, our communities, and 
our form of government. How have Americans grappled with this question? What has 
this meant in political philosophy, moral philosophy, in the laws of the land, and in the 
institutions that engender values and give meaning to life? This question brings together 
several academic fields such as government, law, philosophy, and American intellectual 
history. It is only one question among many that can be raised and explored inside the 
classical ethical question: how ought we to order our lives together, a question too
1 Michael Perry recently served as Professor o f Law at the Northwestern University School o f Law and is 
author o f Love and Power: The Role o f Religion and Morality in America (1991). His book defends a place 
for religious conviction in moral-political discourse.
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3expansive for the scope of this paper. In order to provide focus and tie several themes 
together into a manageable and coherent thesis, I choose to focus on the proper role of 
religious conviction in the formation of law. This is an admittedly narrow window to 
gain some insight into the larger question: how ought we to order our lives together.
The organization of the paper begins with selected writings from John Locke, John 
Stuart Mill, and John Dewey. I choose them to represent views that characterize three 
moments in moral and political thought in American intellectual history before World 
War Two. They will also serve to lay a foundation for turning to more recent writings by 
moral and political philosophers. In chapter two I will consider the writings of John 
Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Audi, David Richards, Phillip Hammond and Thomas 
Nagel. They will serve as a reference point for the family of liberal positions expressed 
in the last thirty years. I borrow the term “family of liberal positions” from Nicholas 
Wolterstorff who introduces it as a means of recognizing that the liberal position is 
reflective of a great range of perspectives and differences. For the purpose o f this paper, 
the defining characteristic of the liberal position as it pertains to moral-political discourse 
is the belief that religious convictions as a justification for coercive legislation should 
properly be constrained, to varying degrees, from strict exclusion to inclusion within 
narrow and specific qualifications. In chapter three I will explore those authors who 
advocate a less constrained role for religious convictions in moral-political discourse. I 
will discuss the arguments of Michael Perry, Kent Greenawalt, William Galston,
Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Michael Carter where they challenge the liberal position. And 
finally, in chapter four I will turn to selected court cases involving obscenity laws to 
ascertain, both implicitly and explicitly, the justification employed by judges to support
4or deny the constitutionality of obscenity laws. I will raise the question: did religious 
convictions about how we ought to live together influence or inform the judges’ 
decisions?
This approach makes an assumption about the role of the Supreme Court in American 
moral-political discourse. I assume to some degree that laws reveal conflicts in society 
and are indicative of tension rather than an expression of commonly shared values and 
beliefs. Alisdair MacIntyre2 argues that the “function of the Supreme Court must be to 
keep peace between rival social groups adhering to rival and incompatible principles of 
justice by displaying a fairness which consists in even-handedness in its adjudications 
(253).” He further states, “The nature of any society... is not deciphered from its laws 
alone, but from those understood as an index o f its conflicts (254).” I believe the court 
cases involving obscenity laws will serve as a window to explore the conflict in 
American culture, the diversity o f opinion surrounding the proper role of religious 
convictions in making laws, and an even greater diversity when raising the larger ethical 
question: how ought we to order our lives in society.
2 Alisdair MacIntyre was Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University when A fter Virtue was 
published in 1981. His book challenged the thesis that modernity possesses a commonly accepted ethical 
paradigm “thick” enough to resolve tough moral-political issues. He later served as Professor of 
Philosophy at Notre Dame and at Duke University.
Early Foundations in Moral-Political Philosophy
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey made important contributions to the 
historical development of American intellectual, moral, and political history. I highlight 
several themes in their writings, themes that focus on those fermenting principles of 
liberalism that bear directly on the proper role of religious convictions in moral- political 
discourse as follows: (1) the tension between protection of individual freedom and 
community welfare, (2) the lexical priority of individual rights set against community 
interests, (3) separation of church and state, (4) the argument for state neutrality on 
conceptions and pursuit of the good, (5) scientific naturalism or rationalism defended as 
the common language and authority o f public discourse, (6) coercive law justified on the 
basis o f physical harm to others, and (7) morality severed from religious authority.
In his classic On Liberty, J.S. Mill3 writes about “the nature and limits of the power 
which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual,” that is, the tension 
between liberty and law, the need for effective government control contrasted with the 
need to protect individuals against the tyranny of political rulers (5). He acknowledges 
this inherent tension when he writes, “Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, 
by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the 
operation of law (9).” John Locke4 also recognizes this tension when he persuasively 
defends comprehensive individual freedom and equality in his Second Treatise on
3 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), published On Liberty in 1859, a classic text in the history o f political 
thought and the subject o f sustained debate.
4 John Locke (1632-1704) represents the great heritage o f Enlightenment political philosophers who 
elevated the value o f human individuality and influenced the establishment o f American Democracy.
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6Government He argues that the legitimacy of government is grounded upon the consent
of the governed. Locke writes:
Men being... by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put 
out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without 
his consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of this natural 
liberty... is by agreeing with other men to join and unite in community for 
their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another (Locke 
Second Treatise 52)
And yet, even as he defends individual freedom and the consent of the governed, he 
attempts to balance individual interests with community interests. He argues that “no 
opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules necessary to the preservation 
of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate... such things as undermine the 
foundations o f society, and are therefore condemned by the judgment o f all mankind 
(Locke Toleration 61).” John Dewey also sets parameters around individual freedom of 
action. He writes, “all men require moral sanctions in their conduct; the consent of their 
kind... .No man ever lived with the exclusive approval of his own conscience (76).” 
Locke, Mill, and Dewey are great defenders of individual freedom of thought and action, 
yet they each recognize an inherent tension between the limits of individual freedom and 
community welfare.
Mill attempts to resolve this tension in two ways. First, he defends the lexical priority
of individual rights. And second, he appeals to the utilitarian “harm principle” as a
rational resolution to conflicting individual and community interests. He writes:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or 
collectively, in interfering with the liberty and action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not sufficient warrant... to justify [coercion], the conduct from 
which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to
7someone else.... Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual 
is sovereign (13).” Emphasis mine.
Mill argues for the lexical priority of individual choice on matters o f conscience and
conduct. He defends this position on the utilitarian principle: “I regard utility as the
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being (14).” Mill believes
that the greatest depth of personal happiness and fulfillment is achieved through the
exercise o f personal liberty and freedom, to choose for one’s self on issues o f belief,
conduct, conscience, and on concepts of the goal and purpose o f life. He defends the
protection of personal liberty as that which leads to the greatest aggregate happiness.
According to Mill, problems arise because of “the feeling in each person’s mind that
everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would
like to act (9).” He argues that rules of conduct must appeal to some reason accepted by
others. Personal preference and the “similar opinion o f others like minds” is not
sufficient justification (10). Mill argues that human liberty comprises:
First, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of 
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense, absolute freedom of opinion 
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or 
theological.... Secondly, the principle [of liberty] requires liberty of tastes 
and pursuits; of framing the plan of life to suit our own character; of doing 
as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without 
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not 
harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, 
or wrong (15).
Mill is concerned that majority opinion might usurp the freedom of thought and action of 
the individual. The following quote expresses this concern, a concern consistent with the 
liberal position today.
8Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: 
there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion 
and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose by other means than 
civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those 
who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent 
the formation of individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel 
all character to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a 
limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual 
independence. And to find that limit, and maintain it against 
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as 
protection against political despotism... (8-9)”
Mill articulates in this statement a deep concern for the protection of individual autonomy
against the imposed will of the majority, the lexical priority o f individual rights set
against a majoritarian imposition of the common good.
This same concern is absent in the writings of Locke, who seems amenable to a
community moral consensus, that is, rules of conduct established by the majority. When
Locke defends freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and the separation o f church
and state, he does not prescribe the same protection for freedom of action. As already
stated, he contends that “no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate... such
things as undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the
judgment of all mankind (Locke Toleration 61).” He argues:
A good life in which consists not the least of religion and true piety, 
concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety both of men’s 
souls and the common wealth. Moral actions belong therefore to the 
jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and 
domestic governor; I mean, both of the magistrate and the conscience 
(Locke Toleration 56).
Locke defends the rule of the majority as a solution to the tension between individual and
community interest, a principle disputed by Mill. Locke states, “Whosoever therefore out
of the state o f nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all power,
9necessary to the management of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any 
number greater than the majority (Locke Toleration 53).” This principle supports a 
communitarian justification for legislation that is “for the good of the community,” a 
position explicitly stated by some Supreme Court judges in the court cases we will be 
considering later in this paper. In this context, the good of the community is defined by 
the majority opinion through a democratic voting process of a given community, a 
principle imminently detestable to Mill.
It can be argued that Locke’s conception of a common good, interpreted in the context 
of eighteenth century American culture, is greatly influenced by a religious worldview, 
specifically, a Protestant worldview. This Mill finds unnecessarily oppressive and 
constraining. Mill advocates a strong separation between religious conviction and state 
coercion, believing religion is one of the most powerful elements “which have entered 
into the formation of moral feeling, having almost always been governed either by the 
ambition of hierarchy, seeking control over every department o f human conduct, or by 
the spirit of Puritanism (16-17).” He argues persuasively from history that laws based on 
religious conviction have been used to justify and violate individual rights in matters of 
conscience and action. Mill certainly challenges a Christian notion of morality as a basis 
for justification in moral-political discourse, “That mankind owe a great deal to this 
morality, and to its early teachers, I should be the last person to deny; but I do not scruple 
to say of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one-sided, and that unless 
ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the formation of European life 
and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they are now 
(50).” This quote is in the context of an argument for freedom of thought and speech in
10
which Mill challenges those who believe religious morality in general, and Christianity in 
particular, is the whole truth for social norms and dissent is not to be tolerated on the 
basis of the common good for society.
John Dewey5 introduces a separate argument to resolve the tension between individual
and community interests when he lays down some ethical principles in his essay on Art,
Science and Moral Progress. Consistent with Kantian thought, Dewey contends that
individuals should not be used as means to an end. They should not be sacrificed for the
good of society. Instead, he believes democracy should create a social culture that
enables individuals to fully realize their “own personality” and potential in the state. He
defends the principle of state neutrality on competing conceptions of the good. He
further believes that morality must be freed from absolute concepts of the good and
transcendent authority. Morality should submit to scientific methodology and social
experiment in which the right is defined as that which “works best” for individuals and
society, the “ought” defined instrumental and pragmatic and not as a means to one great
telos. The following quote from Dewey captures the essence of this paradigm shift:
From this point of view there is no separate body of moral rules; no 
separate system of moral powers; no separate subject matter of moral 
knowledge, and hence no such thing as isolated ethical science. If the 
business of morals is not to speculate upon man’s final end, and upon the 
ultimate standards of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology, and 
psychology to discover all that can be discovered of man, his organic 
powers and propensities. If its business is not to search for the one 
separate moral motive, it is to converge all the instrumentalities of the 
social arts, o f law, education, economics and political science upon the 
construction of intelligent methods of improving the common lot (73-74).
Dewey argues that ethics should be severed from religious authority. He rejects an
absolute, transcendent concept of moral good that defines right and wrong. Instead he
5 John Dewey (1860-1952) was one o f the most influential moral-political philosophers in The United 
States at the tum o f the 20th century and preceding World War Two.
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appeals to science as the final arbitrator in moral-political discourse. Human experience 
and scientific rationality becomes the common “authoritative” language of public 
discussion and excludes an appeal to religious myth and superstition.
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey were each strong defenders of 
individual rights, advocating comprehensive freedom of thought, conscience, expression, 
and behavior for citizens independent of state control and coercion. Yet each recognized 
an inherent tension between individual freedom and social welfare. Mill defended the 
lexical priority of individual rights against the tyranny o f majority opinion expressed 
through coercive state mechanism. He certainly challenged the concept o f a community 
common good defined on the basis of religious conviction. Dewey likewise challenged a 
religious epistemology and argued that the good of society should be defined in the 
common language of scientific rationalism and ethical pragmatism. The good of 
individuals and society should be defined simply as that which best allows humanity to 
flourish and fulfill their own potential. In contrast, Locke’s defense o f individual 
freedom, especially in matters of religious belief, is firmly entrenched in a Protestant 
morality. His defense of freedom of thought and conscience does not extend to actions 
that violate a community moral consensus. He does not defend the lexical priority of 
individual rights over majoritarian conceptions of the good, a good defined in eighteenth 
century American culture and law by a Protestant majority.
The Family of Liberal Positions
Two of the enduring foundational principles of liberalism are commitments to
individual freedom and equality. In liberal thought, only a limited government can be
justified; indeed, the basic task of government is to protect the equal liberty of citizens.
According to Thomas Nagel6, the great challenge for the political theorist, one that has
never been sufficiently resolved, is to resolve conflicts between individual autonomy and
community responsibility: how to protect individual choice and freedom and at the same
time protect community interests (23). The relationship between religious conviction
and political choices bears directly on this tension. Robert Audi7 writes:
Religion and politics are perennial topics o f concern and debate in any free 
society... especially in the United States. It is inevitable that reflective 
religious people should discuss religion and that thoughtful citizens should 
discuss politics. It is perhaps not inevitable, but it is altogether 
appropriate, for a liberal democracy -  a free and democratic society -  in 
which religion is a major cultural force to concern itself with the 
relationship between religion and politics....It demands a good 
understanding of the proper balance between, on the one hand, religious 
commitments that bear on what sort of society we shall have, and on the 
other hand, political and secular considerations pertinent to the same range 
objectives (Audi Religious Commitment ix)
6 Thomas Nagel is a law professor who recently taught at NYU. His book Equality and Partiality was 
published in 1991.
Robert Audi is Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor o f Philosophy at the University o f Nebraska, 
Lincoln. His books include The Structure o f  Justification (1993) and Moral Knowledge and Ethical 
Character (1997). He has served as editor for the widely acclaimed Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy.
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He goes on to argue that one of the current challenges of democracy is “the delicate 
problem of how a free and democratic society can achieve appropriate harmony between 
religion and politics (Audi Religions Commitment 3).
o
Nancy Rosenblum recently served as editor on a book of essays addressing the 
tentative symbiotic relationship between religion and politics. She agues that the flurry 
of current debate on this issue centers on three recent changes in our society: “an 
explosion of religious pluralism; an increase in government activism effecting religious 
associations -  both coercive regulations and subsidies, benefits, and inducements; and the 
prominence of ‘integralism,’ or the push for a ‘religiously integrated existence’ (4).” She 
describes the nature of current debate when she writes that “Militant secularists fight to 
keep religion out of political arenas and public coffers, and believers fight back, both 
sides firing accusations and both sides claiming vulnerability (4).” John Rawls9 
acknowledges this conflict between religion and democracy when he writes, “I have been 
concerned with a torturing question in the contemporary world, namely: can democracy 
and comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, be compatible? And if so, how?” 
(Rawls Public Reasons 175)
A central tenet in the liberal position maintains that religious convictions should 
“properly” be constrained in any attempt to resolve this tension. This chapter will 
highlight seven key arguments from within the liberal position that seek to resolve the 
tension between liberty and law while maintaining a “proper” constraint upon religious
8 Nancy Rosenblum is Henry Merrit Wriston Professor and Professor of Political Science at Brown 
University. She is the editor of Liberation and the Moral Life and was editor o f the book Obligations of 
Citizenship and Demands o f Faith (2000).
9 John Rawls is an American philosopher and political theorist. He earned his Ph.D. from Princeton and 
taught at Princeton, Cornell, and MIT before becoming professor o f philosophy at Harvard (1962). His 
book Theory o f Justice (1971) revived interest in systematic, normative political philosophy.
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conviction. It is important to note up front that the liberal position constitutes a range o f
perspectives. Robert Audi highlights the fact that the liberal position includes both a
“strong view” and a “weak view”. He writes, “a strong view requires that those reasons
[religious convictions] not be a determining factor at all [in moral political discourse]; a
weaker view would simply require that they not be the only determining factor (Audi
Religion in the Public Square 123).” Audi himself prefers the weaker view:
I propose that (particularly when advocating or supporting laws or public 
policies that would restrict liberty) conscientious citizens have a prima 
facie obligation to have and be willing to offer at least one secular reason 
that is evidentially adequate and motivationally sufficient... there, then, is 
one liberal position that provides reasons for more space for the operation 
of religious reasons that one would expect from liberalism... (Audi 
Religion in the public Square 123).
A common premise within the liberal position maintains that the religious diversity of
America precludes finding a common ground in moral-political discourse in
comprehensive religious doctrines. A second premise posits that a commitment to
individual freedom and constitutional integrity requires state neutrality on conceptions of
the good, particularly in regard to religious belief. A third premise argues that coercive
laws based upon religious convictions violate the establishment clause. This leads to a
critical question. If religious convictions cannot provide a common ground or a moral
foundation for coercive laws, how does the state legitimize any constraint upon
individual freedom and autonomy? Within the liberal positions, four common
paradigms are defended as legitimate solutions to the tension between liberty and law.
First, there is an attempt to establish a common ground in shared political principles.
Second, there is an appeal to a shared moral consensus. Third, some derivative of Mill’s
15
harm principle is advocated. And fourth, there is an appeal to a common rationality and 
reasons accessible to all.
Consistent with the family of liberal positions, John Rawls believes that the great
religious and philosophical diversity of American culture precludes a justificatory role in
moral-political debate for religion or other comprehensive doctrines. He states:
The political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a 
diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines. Some of them are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity 
among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable long- 
run result o f powers of human reason at work within the background of 
enduring free institutions (Rawls Political Liberalism 3-4).
Because of the diverse and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines,
Rawls argues that a comprehensive doctrine cannot “secure the basis o f social unity, nor
can it provide the context of public reason on fundamental political questions (Political
Liberalism 134).”
Thomas Nagel presents a similar argument in his book, Equality and Partiality10. He 
argues that moral-political theory' must seek a common ground distinct and separate from 
religious belief because of the great religious diversity o f America. He writes, “the pure 
ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of state power should be capable of being 
authorized by each citizen... through acceptance of the principles, institutions, and the 
procedures of how that power will be used (8)”. Like Rawls, Nagle maintains that 
religious belief cannot establish a comprehensive moral system adequate to resolve the 
disputes of law and society on how we ought to order our lives together. According to 
Nagle, religious belief certainly cannot establish rules and principles for coercive laws 
endorsed by all.
10 Equality and Partiality was published in 1991
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David Richards11 also defends this same position in his book Toleration and the 
Constitution. He maintains that religious convictions must be separated from ethics in 
moral-political debate. Like Rawls and Nagle, he argues that the religious diversity of 
America makes this a necessity (127). Because of religious diversity, there is a need for 
“a common ethical basis... an ethics of equal respect centering on all purpose general 
goods (128).” He further states, “others should not exercise illegitimate control over or 
compromise the ultimate responsibility of the persons for forming, expressing, and 
revising personal conscience (133).” Richards’ advocates a conception of universal 
toleration that “must encompass all belief systems, religious and nonreligious, expressive 
of moral powers of rationality and reasonableness.” He writes, “Our heritage of both 
utilitarian and Kantian ethics maintains that our moral powers acknowledge 
uncompromising ethical obligations independent of God’s will (138).”
This leads to another important premise, state neutrality on conceptions of the good. 
Moral political theorist Bruce Ackerman12 strongly defends the principle of state 
neutrality in his book Social Justice in the Liberal State. He argues that moral-political 
debate should exclude all beliefs about the good, the right, and the fitting way to live life 
that are not shared in common, a common ground established through a sifting process of 
public debate. If individuals have different perceptions of good and right, neither 
perception can be justified as intrinsically superior to another, by the simple process of 
elimination, only commonly shared moral premises are left standing. Ackerman argues,
11 David Richards is a law professor who recently taught at the New York University School of Law. He is 
a career legal academic and author of Toleration and the Constitution (1986).
12 Bruce Ackerman is currently Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University. Previously he was Charles 
Keller Beekman Professor o f Law and Philosophy, Colombia (1982-87). His area o f expertise includes 
Constitutional law and political/legal philosophy. Social Justice in the Liberal State was published in 1980.
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“liberal conversation provides a communal process that deepens each person’s claim to
autonomy at the same time it recognizes others as no less worthy of respect (347).” He
further argues that “it is the essence of liberalism to deny people the right to declare their
particular metaphysics and epistemology contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth (357).” He writes:
Nobody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a 
privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied the rest o f us. A 
power structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through 
conversation in which some person (or group) must assert he is (or they 
are) the privileged moral authority.
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason if it requires the power 
holder to assert:
a. that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by 
any of his fellow citizens, or
b. that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically 
superior to one or more of his fellows (Ackerman 10-11).
Ackerman defends a neutral approach to political debate that begins in silence. He takes
as a philosophical starting point “there is no moral meaning hidden in the universe. All
there is is you and I struggling in a world that neither we, nor any other thing, created
(368).” This is clearly a worldview shaped by evolutionary theory and by naturalistic
assumptions about reality, “the way things really are,” a worldview rejected by many
American citizens. According to Ackerman, a liberal democracy “offers each citizen the
chance to achieve self-understanding without subordinating himself to meanings imposed
by others (231).” And the aim of social justice in the liberal state is a community in
which “each is guaranteed the right to live his own life regardless of what his neighbors
think o f him (376).” Any limits to individual freedom are those limits free and equal
citizens would agree upon. In Ackerman’s paradigm for moral-political discourse,
neutral dialogue provides:
18
A means by which citizen-statesman can resolve good-faith disagreements 
without claiming the right to impose their idea of happiness on 
another... each citizen’s judgment is worthy of greater respect than the 
view of some transcendent being... So long as the rule can be justified 
through neutral conversation, its legitimacy has been established within a 
dialogic theory of legitimacy (319).
A third premise in the liberal position maintains that religious conviction as a sole 
justification for coercive law violates the establishment clause. Richards argues, “others 
should not exercise illegitimate control over or compromise the ultimate responsibility of 
the persons for forming, expressing, and revising personal conscience (133).” He 
defends his thesis based on an expansive definition of the First Amendment religious 
clauses. He includes freedom of conscience as a protected freedom: “the state must 
guarantee and secure persons a greatest equal respect for rational and reasonable 
capacities of persons themselves to originate, exercise, express, and change theories of 
life and how to live well (136).” To defend his position, he turns to a critical historical 
judicial decision: the United States v. Ballard13. In this case the court “rejected the truth 
of religious belief as a constitutionally valid criteria for state action (Richards 138).” 
According to Richards, “the moral basis of the free exercise clause, properly understood, 
is a negative liberty, immunizing from state coercion the exercise of the conceptions of a 
life well and ethically lived and expressions of mature person’s rational and reasonable 
powers (140).” Richards turns once again to the Supreme Court. He states that there has 
been a paradigm shift in the courts since World War II, “questioning the constitutionality 
acceptability of religion as a suitable proxy for the state’s promotion of appropriate
13 United States v. Ballard (1944) was a unique case. The Defendant was charged with mail fraud. Under 
the guise of religious belief, he solicited money through the mail for the promise o f divine healing. The 
court did not focus on the veracity o f his religious beliefs, instead the court focused upon the defendant’s 
willful intent to cheat and defraud others. I think Richards draws the wrong conclusion form this case. In 
this unique historical situation involving Guy W. Ballard, the court decided the veracity o f Ballard’s 
religious beliefs was immaterial to the charge o f fraud. Richard’s conclusion moves beyond the specific 
historical situation o f this case to a wider application that is certainly debatable.
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neutral purposes for public morality... (249).” As a result, in the interpretation of law, the 
link between religion and morality and religion and ethics has been severed and the 
courts have shifted to a “neutral conception of enforceable public morality (251),” tied to 
Mill’s harm criteria and contractarian ideas of democratic theory and practice.
Phillip Hammond14 in his essay Can Religion Be Religious in Public also argues, “The 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the use of governmental 
authority to enforce religion’s authority (20).” Based on his interpretation of the First 
Amendment establishment clause, he argues that religious discourse must relinquish 
public authority. By this he means that personal convictions based on religious 
epistemology should not use governmental authority to legislate restrictive behavior. The 
state should not lend its authority to prefer one conviction over another if that conviction 
is based on religious authority (22). Central to his thesis, he believes that religious 
conviction as a source of moral authority for constraining behavior in society connotes an 
establishment of a state-imposed religious belief, and thereby is a violation of church and 
state under a broad definition of the establishment clause.
Any acceptance of the three premises presented thus far raises a critical question: if 
religious convictions cannot provide a common ground or a moral foundation for 
coercive laws, how does the state legitimize any constraint upon individual freedom and 
autonomy?
Moral-political philosopher John Rawls seeks a common ground in moral-political 
justification a step removed from moral premises based upon comprehensive doctrines, 
religious or nonreligious, and philosophical first principles. He seeks a common ground a
14 Phillip Hammond is D. Mackenzie Brown Professor of Religious Studies and Sociology at the University 
o f California, Santa Barbara. His books include With Liberty for All (1998). He has been editor of the 
Journal fo r the Scientific Study o f  Religion.
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step removed from questions concerning moral right and wrong and one’s understanding
of the proper and fitting way to live a good life. He argues that the reasons or the
justification for laws that constrain individual autonomy must be directly tied to the
values and principles of a liberal democracy and a reasonable conception of political
justice. He states:
When may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coercive political 
power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake? Or in 
the light of what principles and ideals must we exercise that power if our 
doing so is to be justifiable to others as free and equal? To this question 
political liberalism replies: our exercise of political power is proper and 
hence justifiable only when exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in 
light of principles and ideas acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.
This is the liberal principle o f legitimacy. And since the exercise of 
political power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a 
moral, not a legal, duty -  the duty of civility -  to be able to explain to one 
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies 
they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of 
public reason. This duty also involves a willingness to listen to others in 
fair mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should 
reasonable be made {Political Liberalism 217).
Rawls’s conception of a constitutional democracy maintains “citizens in domestic 
society offer to cooperate on “fair” terms with other citizens {Public Reasons 25).” He 
further expresses his political theory when he describes a constitutional democracy as “a 
relationship of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a 
collective body {Public reasons 136).” He acknowledges that his conception of a 
constitutional democracy is tied to “contract theory” as defended by such notable political 
theorist as John Locke and Rousseau {Public reasons 13).
In a political system so understood, Rawls endeavors to find a common ground among 
citizens with very different comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, that may 
be irreconcilable. He argues that in a political system where citizens share equally in
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political power, each citizen must justify their moral premises in a manner that others can 
endorse. In other words, in a political system founded upon the consent of the governed, 
laws that restrain individual liberty must, to some degree, be justified to those so 
governed, reasons understood and accepted by all.
Rawls argues that one element of “common ground” is the values and principles of a
liberal democracy or political values:
Examples of political values include those mentioned in the preamble of 
the United States Constitution: a more perfect union, justice, domestic 
tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity. These include under them other 
values: so, for example, under justice we also have equal basic liberties, 
equality o f opportunity, ideals concerning the distribution of wealth (The 
Law o f  Peoples 144).
The second necessary component in establishing a common ground in public reasons 
is a reasonable liberal political conception of justice. Rawls favors justice as fairness. I 
mention only one of the key characteristics in a “reasonable liberal political conception of 
justice” as used by Rawls: the criterion of reciprocity; “this criterion requires that, when 
terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing 
them must think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, 
and not as dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political or 
social position (The Law o f  Peoples 14).”
Rawls argues that justification for moral-political discourse, especially laws that
constrain individual autonomy, must appeal to a common ground of political values
based on a liberal constitutional democracy and a reasonable concept of justice.
Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political 
conceptions of justice, and to ascertainable evidence and facts open to 
public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are the 
most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public reason is not
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simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it proceeds 
correctly from premises we accept and think others could reasonably 
accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept {The 
Law o f  Peoples 155).
Like Rawls, Nagle attempts to establish fair rules and procedures of government for a
free and equal people; however, he expands the parameters to include a common ground
based on a moral consensus. The paradigm Nagel defends is based upon Kantian
unanimity: the right result (in moral-political discourse) is achieved as different persons,
reasoning from different perspectives, converge on moral truth (34). His paradigm,
unlike Rawls, who seeks a common ground in the shared principles of a liberal
democracy and common perceptions of justice, looks for a common ground in shared
moral-premises. He develops a paradigm for moral-political discourse that places a
priority upon the “impersonal starting point: a starting point independent o f who we are
(Nagle 10).” According to Nagle:
Ethics and political theory begin when from the impersonal stand point we 
focus on the raw data provided by individual desires, interests, projects, 
attachments, allegiances, and plans of life that define the personal points 
of view of the multitude o f distinct individuals, ourselves included... at 
that point... we recognize some of these things to have impersonal value 
( 11).
In other words, commonly held values and moral-premises emerge from the sifting of 
individual perspectives. This “common ground” o f shared values and perspectives serves 
to establish unanimity for ethics and political theory and legitimizes a liberal democracy 
embraced by consenting citizens. According to Nagle, the goal o f political theory simply 
stated is to “justify a political system to everyone who is required to live under it... the 
search for legitimacy is a search for unanimity -  not about everything but with the 
controlling framework within the more controversial decisions will be made (33).”
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Richards defends this same principle of overlapping moral consensus when he writes
about “our heritage of both utilitarian and Kantian Ethics ...(138). He ties this shared
moral consensus specifically to Mill’s harm principle:
(1) Acts may properly be made criminal only if they inflict harm on 
assigned people. (2) Except to protect children, incompetents, and 
backward peoples, it is never proper to criminalize an act solely on the 
ground of protecting harm to an agent. (3) It is never proper to criminalize 
conduct solely because the mere thought of it gives offense (239).
Although Richards defends the harm principle as a justification for laws that constrain,
he rejects this principle based on a utilitarian ethic. He defers to Rawlsian contractarian
theory as superior. In contractarian terms:
Enforcement of public morality must thus achieve two ends: first, it should 
impose common standards o f minimal decency necessary to ensure 
reasonable cooperation among peoples; and second, it should define those 
standards in a way that respects the inalienable right to moral 
independence, exercised in commitment to diverse and often competing 
sub-communities. From this sort of contractarian perspective, an unjust 
enforcement at large of ethical standards of one sectarian community -  
infringing on interests central to the just moral independence of others -  is 
not an acceptable policy outcome in a liberal democracy.... Public power 
must be limited to the pursuit o f the general goods that rational and 
reasonable people would want protected... And when pursuit of such 
goods abridges essential moral interests (conscience, privacy), such a law 
must be both necessary and indispensable to secure such goods, and do so 
in the way least restrictive of such interests (245).
Richards argues that the harm principle should be interpreted in the context of
contractarian theory that protects general goods and Rawlsian principles of a liberal
democracy such as life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, equality, and privacy.
Robert Audi defends this same position in a 1993 San Diego Law Review article 
entitled The Place o f Religious Argument. Audi argues that before behavior can be 
constrained by force of law, it must violate the rights of another person. He contends that 
because a liberal democracy is a sociopolitical system that places high priority on
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protecting the autonomy of individuals, it should only pass laws that constrain behavior if 
there is a clear scientific, empirical, cause and effect relationship between personal 
behavior and harm to another person (Audi Religious Argument 690).
The relationship between evidence and personal harm introduces an additional
principle for resolving the tension between liberty and law, a principle that excludes
religious conviction as a sole justification for coercive law. A belief in an accepted form
of reasoning or public rationality is a common theme in the family of liberal positions.
According to Audi, religious convictions as a justification for law do not carry legislative
authority because by definition, their appeal to truth does not depend upon rational
standards accessible to all without reference to transcendent authority. An appeal to
science becomes the “acceptable” authority in moral-political debate:
If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a rational informed 
person, to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify with the deed 
and will tend to resent having to do it. Even if the deed should be my 
obligation, still where only esoteric knowledge - say, through revelation 
that only the imitated experience -  can show that it is, I will tend to resent 
coercion. And it is part o f the under-lying rationale of liberalism that we 
should not have to feel this kind of resentment -  that we give up autonomy 
only where, no matter what our specific preferences or particular 
worldview, we can be expected, given adequate rationality and sufficient 
information, to see that we would have so acted on our own (Audi 
Religious Argument 690).
Hammond expresses this same belief when he writes, “In the public square, religion must
advance its positions on empirical, rational, or logical grounds (30)”. Likewise,
Ackerman rejects transcendent belief as a legitimate epistemology; by default, scientific
methodology and rationality become the only acceptable “common language” of moral
political debate (358).
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Both Audi and Hammond argue that moral premises based upon religious convictions 
are not legitimate in moral-political discourse until those premises are translated into 
secular purposes, with specific public goods, with falsifiable justifications, and with 
empirical evidence accessible to all, without an appeal to transcendent authority or 
religious reasons as the sole basis for coercive law. Then and only then, can religious 
arguments enter the public square as a justification for a moral premise in the moral- 
political justificatory process.
Consistent with Audi, Hammond, and Richards, Michael Perry15 defends as a general
rule that moral premises cannot be justified solely on the basis of an appeal to truth or
authority that others would reject. To make his point, he quotes J. Bryan Hehir, principle
drafter o f the U.S. Catholic bishop’s 1983 letter on nuclear deterrence:
‘Religiously based insights, values and arguments at some point must be 
rendered persuasive to the wider civic public. There is legitimacy to 
proposing a sectarian argument within the confines of a religious 
community, but it does violence to the fabric o f pluralism to expect 
acceptance of such an argument in the wider public arena. When a 
religious moral claim will affect the wider public, it should be proposed in 
a fashion which the public can evaluate, accept or reject on its own terms.
The [point]... is not to banish religious insight from public life [, but only 
to] establish a test for the religious communities to meet; to probe our 
commitments deeply and broadly enough that we can translate their best 
insights to others’ (108).
To argue that child pornography is immoral based upon a religious conviction
violates the intent of this principle. To argue that child pornography presents a
possible psychological or physiological danger to children, or violates the liberal
15 Michael Perry recently served as Professor of Law at the Northwestern University School of Law and is 
author o f Love and Power: The Role o f Religion and Morality in America (1991). His book defends a place 
for religious conviction in moral-political discourse.
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principle o f equality, is consistent with this principle of speaking in terms others 
can evaluate, accept, or reject.
A common premise within the family of liberal positions argues that religious 
convictions cannot provide a common ground or a moral foundation for coercive laws. 
Instead, four common paradigms are defended as legitimate solutions to the tension 
between liberty and law. Rawls appeals to a common ground in shared political 
principles. Nagle and Ackerman appeal to a shared moral consensus. Richards appeals to 
a contratarian application of Mill’s harm principle. And finally, Audi and Hammonds 
appeal to scientific naturalism as the common rationality and political authority 
accessible and acceptable to all.
A Challenge to the Liberal Position
The arguments presented that seek to resolve the tension between individual freedom 
and legitimate state coercion independent and exclusive of religious conviction are not 
without their detractors. William A. Galston16, in his book Liberal Purposes: Goods, 
Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State, attempts to defend the liberal position, but 
with a specific nuance. He rejects “a pervasive theoretical understanding of liberalism as 
neutral regarding human goods” and replaces “it with an alternative understanding of 
liberalism in which specific goods and virtues figure centrally (42).” He provides a 
critique of the liberal position without being hostile to the basic tenets of liberalism. He 
attempts to combine consent of the governed and protection o f the widest range of 
individual freedom and conceptions o f the good, with those ‘Virtues” he argues are 
necessary to allow the liberal state to flourish and survive now and in posterity. He is 
concerned with the liberal culture in America: the apparent lack of virtue and the signs of 
social disintegration such as the break up of families, alarming violent crime statistics, 
drug abuse, greed and the like (6). He argues that the liberal state depends upon cultural 
capital, that is, the character of its citizens: “liberalism is committed to equality, but it 
needs excellence. It is committed to freedom, but it needs virtue (11).” He spends an 
entire chapter of his book advocating specific virtues such as individual responsibility,
16 William Galston is a professor at the University of Maryland and Institute for Philosophy and Public 
Policy (College Park, Maiyland).
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fidelity in family relationships, self-sacrifice, tolerance, respect for diversity; and work 
place ethics such as initiative, drive, and determination (222-223).
He believes, “Policies that liberals typically defend as neutral are experienced by 
many religious communities as hostile. Liberals see themselves as defenders of our 
constitutional faith, while many of the religiously faithful see themselves as the victims 
of secular aggression (13).” He challenges the belief that an attempt to find common 
ground in moral-political debate properly excludes a belief in transcendence. He argues 
that debate on public policy and law should include “certain core notions to which the 
overwhelming majority of a particular community subscribes and which help constitute 
its special identity (24-25).”
Galston further argues that diversity does not in fact establish a common ground as 
Rawls, Nagle and Ackerman anticipate, a common ground flexible enough to shape 
public policy and a political system. The opposite may be the case. Reasonable people 
may arrive at different conclusions concerning the fundamental principles of a shared 
political culture. And reasonable people may possess very different conceptions of social 
justice. Galston states that liberalism based on neutrality fails because “no society is fully 
universal; every society picks out some favored goals and ways of life while discouraging 
or repressing others (30).” He further states, “Morality is in part local, particular, 
community-based, historical; and reason may not be fully competent to resolve 
contradictions among considerations relevant to the rational determination of moral 
judgment (38).” Therefore he concludes, “It is not necessary to (be able to) reduce 
competing moral considerations to a common measure in order to make publicly 
defensible choices (41).”
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Nicholas WolterstorfF17 also critiques the family of liberal positions on the basis that
there is no commonly accepted or shared political culture. He specifically challenges
Rawls as the leading representative of the position that an independent source distinctive
from religious and other comprehensive doctrines must be established as a source for
moral-political decisions and debate. According to Walterstorff, the specific independent
source Rawls has is mind is public consensus. He writes, “Though he himself does not
use the term consensus populiy his suggestion, at bottom, is that, in a liberal democracy,
the consensus populi ought to be used to form the political basis and discussion and
decisions of the citizens (91-92).” The common ground for citizens is “the shared
political culture of one’s liberal democracy (93).”
Walterstorff argues that it is unreasonable to expect all citizens to share a common
perception of political culture because the political culture of the United States is in fact
constitutive of many different views and conflicting strands. Walterstorff states, “The
prospect of extracting, from the political culture, principles of justice that are both shared
and appropriate to a liberal democracy, is hopeless (97).” He questions Rawls’s
conviction that people share a common form of reasoning leading to shared principles of
what constitutes a liberal democracy, irrespective of religious and comprehensive
doctrines. He states.
No matter what principles o f justice a particular political theorists may 
propose, the reasonable thing for her to expect, given any plausible 
understanding whatever o f ‘reasonable’ and rational, is not that all 
reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather 
that not all of them would do so. It would be utterly unreasonable for her 
to expect of them to accept them (99).
17 Nicholas Walterstorff earned an M.A. & Ph.D. from Harvard University in philosophy. He was a 
professor of philosophy for twenty years at Calvin College. He currently serves as Noah Porter Professor 
of Philosophical Theology in the Yale Divinity School and is an adjunct professor in the Philosophy and 
Religious Studies Department.
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According to Walterstorff, Rawls concedes that finding a shared principle of justice is
untenable. Finding shared principles, as an independent source for moral-political
decisions, is an ideal or goal (101-102).
Walterstorff also argues that no independent resource yields principles needed to
resolve tough, complex, convoluted moral-political issues. He mirrors the sentiment of
Greenawalt who argues in his thesis that principles of a liberal democracy are
inconclusive and unable to resolve complex moral issues like abortion and animal rights.
The principles of a liberal democracy are irrelevant on critical issues of debate. They
cannot resolve critical moral issues like when and should a fetus deserve equal protection
under the law, when does it gain viability and the right to life (102)? And finally, he
believes it is unfair to ask people who sincerely believe religious convictions ought to be
a part of their moral-political decisions, to agree that their convictions are something
other than politics. For many people of faith, their religious convictions shape and
inform their political convictions, the way we ought to order our lives together.
I mentioned earlier in the paper that Richards argues, “Our heritage of both
utilitarian and Kantian ethics maintains that our moral powers acknowledge
uncompromising ethical obligations independent of God’s will (138).” His statement
indicates he believes that the Enlightenment goal o f establishing a universally accepted
moral-ethical paradigm rationally justified apart from religious truth has been successful.
18Adrian MacIntyre challenges this premise in his book, After Virtue. According to 
MacIntyre, the common characteristic of contemporary philosophy is disagreement: 
“there seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture (6).” My
18 Alisdair MacIntyre was a professor o f philosophy at Vanderbilt University when After Virtue was 
published in 1981. He later served as Professor o f Philosophy at Notre Dame.
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point here is simply to highlight the fact that there is no unanimity among contemporary 
moral philosophers on a commonly accepted rationality, that is, there is no commonly 
accepted, rational, “objective” method to weigh rival moral-premises embraced by all.
Stephen Carter19 makes the same argument in his book The Culture o f  Unbelief He 
argues that Post-Enlightenment moral philosophy has been unable to establish settled 
rules to determine truth. He writes, “The principal contribution of the Enlightenment was 
to introduce rationalism to philosophy, to press the case that human reason, by observing 
and deducing, could resolve both moral and factual propositions without the need to 
resort to divine authority (215).” Carter raises the question suggested by philosopher 
Jeffery Stout: has rationalism been so successful “that not only is God unavailable as a 
justification for knowledge, nothing else is either?” When it comes to the issue of public 
morality and laws that constrain, one is left with “an often bewildering variety of 
approaches to the problem of determining the validity of moral claims (215).” Carter 
argues that in a morally diverse and pluralistic society, it is a myth to argue our culture 
shares “common starting points or common forms of reasoning (218).” He challenges 
scientific methodology as the final arbitrator and only admissible epistemology to 
determine issues of morality, a methodology that establishes knowledge and truth on the 
basis o f empirical evidence both measurable and testable and thereby falsifiable. Carter 
contends that scientific naturalism as an epistemology and religious belief as an 
epistemology are both very much concerned with facts. Carter raises an important 
question: why reject a religious starting point in public debate, while including others; 
“moral claims, unlike factual claims, do nor rely for their validity on the generation of
19 Stephen Carter is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale University and his specialty is 
constitutional law.
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testable hypothesis. A question that has bedeviled Western Philosophy since the 
Enlightenment is just what moral claims do rely on for validity (225).”
A challenge is also raised to the belief the state must remain neutral on concepts of the 
good. Galston writes, “No form of government can be justified without some view of 
what is good for individuals (79).” According to Galston, the proponents of political 
liberalism maintain that the state should be neutral on conceptions of the good because: 
first, they hold there is no rational basis for choosing the best good among many; second, 
to do so would violate individual freedom -  to force a good -  on individuals; and third, 
diversity is a fact of modernity. He faults these premises because they assume moral 
skepticism and a lexical priority of individual interests over community interests. He 
denies, “The non-coerced pursuit o f the bad enjoys priority in principle -  that is - in  every 
case -  over the coerced pursuit of the good (87).” As an example, coercive laws that 
prohibit an individual’s right to discriminate in housing or labor practices are legitimate. 
The coerced pursuit of “fair” housing and labor laws is a good that deserves lexical 
priority to an individual’s right to discriminate. He rejects the lexical priority of negative 
freedom and argues that the liberal commitment to negative freedom is not unlimited and 
unbounded (89). In fairness to the authors discussed thus far, no one has advocated 
unlimited and unbounded freedom. At the very least, there is a common appeal to some 
derivative of Mill’s harm principle. Personal freedom is constrained by the principle of 
harm to others in society. It is the difficulty of finding a common consensus on the 
definition of what constitutes harm that embitters public debate on so many key issues 
even within the family of liberal positions.
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Galston denies that a commitment to liberalism implies a commitment to relativism on 
concepts of the good- all good is equal. He holds instead, liberalism is a commitment to a 
conception of the good that places value on equality, liberty, negative freedom, 
individuality, respect, and toleration. These principles of liberalism have “intrinsic 
worth” which elevates them to first principles and “highest order interests (91).” 
According to Galston, “the theory of good presupposed by Rawls, Ackerman, and Nagle, 
is the theory o f rationalist humanism... liberal humanism is not only a substantive theory 
of the good but an eminently contestable theory (92).” He even argues that the liberal 
commitment to moral rationality is coercive and pervasive when it is taught in public 
schools and questions if this concept of the good is hospitable to all ways of life (95). He 
believes liberal humanism is a distinct worldview imposed by a commitment to a rational, 
scientific discourse that excludes religious epistemology. Galston believes that moral- 
political theorists like Rawls, Ackerman, and Richards defend secular scientific 
humanism and rationalism as authoritative and normative for the way society “ought to 
be” and thereby rightfully coerced by the state. Anything “religious” must be converted 
into terms and rationales consistent with a scientific methodology of observable facts, 
testable hypothesis and reasons accessible to all.
Galston contends that neutrality is not possible in idea or as a fact (97). Neutrality is
not neutral because it gives preference to civil considerations when religious practices
come into conflict. Galston quotes theologian Jon Gunneman to illustrate his point:
‘The liberal state, like any state, is not and cannot be fully legitimate. The 
liberal state in particular is illegitimate insofar as it insists on seeing my 
beliefs as my own individual preferences rather than as public truth-claims 
about the world, truth-claims deeply embedded in a social tradition that 
gives those of us it our primary identity and limits all other claims of 
authority. What will you do with us?5 (117)
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Galston asserts that liberal theory relies on three important conceptions of the good: “the 
worth of human existence, the value of the fulfillment of human purposes, and the 
commitment to rationality as the chief guide” in human endeavor (143-144). He argues 
this is a restrictive theory of the good.
He specifically challenges Ackerman’s belief that there should be constraints upon 
reasons that justify public policy by appealing to a superior way of life or concept of the 
good. He challenges Ackerman on three points. First, public debate does not always 
(even often) reach consensus, especially on particulars. Second, an appeal to rational 
argument is itself not neutral; it favors one epistemological approach over others. And 
third, any neutral dialogue must begin with some concept of the good. (106-109).
Kent Greenawalt is another author addressing the complicated relationship between 
the church and state in American society and the proper role of religious convictions in 
moral-political discourse. He stands in opposition to political theorist Ackerman, 
Richards, and Rawls who posit that religious convictions constitute an illegitimate basis 
for moral-political justification in a liberal democracy until translated into reasons 
accessible and acceptable to all. He believes that a basic tenant of political liberalism is 
the right to hold and express personal opinions and beliefs, religious or nonreligious; 
excluding religious convictions as a general rule in moral political debate violates the 
basic foundations of liberalism, equality, freedom of thought, and freedom of expression. 
He further argues that religious convictions are “proper” in moral-political justification
20 Kent Greenawalt studied political philosophy at Oxford and law at Colombia. He has spent his career as 
a legal academic and served as editor-in-chief o f the Columbia Law Review before joining the Colombia 
faculty in 1965. He served as Law clerk to Supreme Court Justice John Harlan. His area o f interest 
includes constitutional law and jurisprudence, with special emphasis on church and state.
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when shared premises and reasons accessible to all have proved to be inconclusive and 
inadequate to resolve issues of fact and value (231).
Greenawalt challenges two tenants of liberalism: individualism and rationalism. He 
writes:
Approval of liberal democracy does imply acceptance of a degree of 
individualism; a liberal democracy rejects compulsion of beliefs and 
patterns of life and regards individuals as a vital protection of a fair 
political process. But a liberal democrat need not deny that human beings 
are social creatures, that human character is socially formed, that the 
arrival of partial truth is achieved by a process of community dialogue, 
and that some of the most fulfilling aspects of human existence involve 
organic social units that have a kind of priority over the individuals within 
them. [He also argues that] unstinting rationalism is no more a required 
component of a justification for liberal democracy than unstinting 
individualism... Acceptance of liberal democracy may presuppose an 
ability of people to work out most practical conflicts by some sort of 
reasoned process, but liberal democrats’ belief in rational capacities can 
fall far short of any assumption that all or most fundamental human 
problems have correct answers at which people arrive by rational 
deliberation (22-23).
This challenge by Greenawalt to these assumed characteristics of political liberalism 
becomes crucial to his later argument for the inclusion of religious convictions in moral- 
political debate: “The argument against reliance on religious convictions often comes 
down to an argument for  reliance on premises that are deemed rational in some way that 
excludes religious convictions (23).” He posits, “though a liberal democracy involves a 
limited commitment to public accessible reasons for decisions, it does not entail for the 
political realm either exclusive reliance on such reasons or an unqualified acceptance of a 
narrow form of rationalism (25).” He believes that in American society, religious 
convictions inform or influence many citizens’ ethical choices, including moral-political 
judgments (30). He argues against any principle in a liberal democracy that excludes 
moral premises solely on the basis that they are religious convictions. Those who
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advocate this principle fail to recognize how difficult it is for the average citizen to 
separate those views shaped by religious convictions and those based on rational criteria 
(44). Greenawalt writes, “theories that exclude many nonreligious premises as well as 
religious convictions do not leave ample grounds for citizens to resolve many political 
issues.” And again he writes, “that no adequate reason exists for preferring all 
nonreligious premises to religious convictions as bases for political judgments (49).” 
Michael Perry in his book Love and Power makes some of the same arguments as 
Greenawalt when he argues for a less constrained role for religious convictions in moral- 
political discourse. Perry seeks to establish a place at the public table for religious 
discourse, and specifically, rules for religious justification for political choices. He 
declares in his introduction, “This book is about the proper relation of morality to politics 
in a morally pluralistic society like the United States. More precisely, it is about the 
proper relation o f a person’s moral beliefs to her political choices, and especially, to her 
public deliberation about her public justification of political choices (3).” His intent is to 
answer the following question: “If religious-moral discourse should not be excluded 
from the public square, how should it be included? In particular, how should discourse 
be brought to bear in the practice of political justification (5)?” He seeks to find a 
middle ground between those with a moral-political philosophy that would divest 
religious-moral discourse of its political authority and “those who would bring religious- 
moral discourse to bear in a sectarian, divisive way (5).”
Perry challenges the viewpoints of three prominent political philosophers-theorists: 
Bruce Ackerman, Thomas Nagel, and John Rawls. He critiques their understanding of 
the proper relationship between religious discourse, morality, and law. He posits that
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even though they may offer a variety of viewpoints and perspectives, they hold in 
common the controlling theme that “disputed beliefs... about human good should play no 
or at most a marginal role in political justification (9).” The disputed beliefs the above 
mentioned authors have in mind usually involve beliefs about human good informed by 
religious convictions, and specifically, religious convictions that are based on an 
epistemology that embraces a belief in the priority of transcendent truth or specific 
revelation such as that contained in a sacred text.
Perry critiques Ackerman’s contention that the sole legitimate basis for coercive law is 
overlapping moral consensus, that is, moral premises shared by all are the only proper 
justifications for law that constrain individual liberty. Perry argues that finding shared 
normative premises may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, because America is a 
morally pluralistic society with many different ideas of what constitutes the good and 
fitting way to live human life. Second, even if common ground is found, this does not 
necessarily mean that moral-ethical issues will be resolved as a point of law. Third, by 
including only those moral premises that individuals hold in common and excluding 
others that are disputed, certain moral premises become privileged. Perry echoes the 
sentiment of Greenawalt in this last premise (9).
Perry contends that an individual may be forced to delegitimize very important core 
convictions and beliefs because they are not shared by another individual, for instance, 
beliefs informed by an epistemology based on “special revelation.” In contrast, another 
individual may find they are able to retain most, if not all, of their core beliefs because 
they are common ground beliefs. Common ground beliefs become “privileged” beliefs 
that can serve as a justification for moral-political decisions, while “disputed” beliefs are
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divested of any authority in public discourse. Perry argues that disputed moral premises 
should not be banned from public debate just because they are disputed beliefs. If public 
debate and compromise revolve only around “common ground” moral premises, there is 
less room for compromise. If disputed beliefs are excluded from the debate as a rule, 
then the bracketing and exclusion of core moral premises becomes the price of admission 
to moral-political discourse for some individuals. This creates a situation that may sow 
seeds of resentment and discontent in a liberal democracy, a political process that should 
be open to the discussion of diverse ideas and positions.
Perry also critiques Thomas Nagel and his moral-political paradigm that asks each 
individual to locate a moral starting point that is independent of “who we are”. In other 
words, one is asked to distance themselves from their presuppositions, their core values, 
their history and experiences. The common denominator in moral-political justification 
in Nagel’s approach becomes “common critical rationality” and “evidence that can be 
shared” (12). Perry critiques Nagel by raising two questions: what evidence does Nagel 
believe can be shared, and what does Nagel mean by common critical rationality? Perry 
argues that the ground one person accepts or rejects as rational or reasonable is tied to 
one’s own understanding of truth and reality within their own belief system. He 
challenges Nagel on the basis of epistemology. In a pluralistic society, Perry argues that 
not everyone is going to find a common ground in defining critical rationality and 
evidence that can be shared by all.
Perry also critiques John Rawls although he favors the neutral or common ground 
paradigm advocated by Rawls. Perry believes it is superior to Ackerman and Nagel 
because, in his opinion, Rawls does not make the mistake of “privileging” common
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premises while rejecting unshared premises (23). According to Perry, Rawls seeks a 
common ground among several different religious and philosophical doctrines in which 
none are rejected or accepted outright. He seeks a point o f contravention, a common 
ground of shared moral premises, a common consensus that becomes authoritative in 
terms of defining the common good because they work to meet human needs.
Perry’s critique of Rawls’ common ground approach to moral-political justification 
centers on this issue: although Perry acknowledges that broad general principles do 
emerge in a form of consensus, that people generally agree one should not murder, steal, 
rape, bear false witness against their neighbor, it is in the particulars where Rawls’s 
approach becomes problematic. In a pluralistic society like the United States, competing 
views of truth and human good create a moral-political atmosphere in which it is 
extremely difficult to find consensus on particulars. It is the details of common life and 
law that deflate the common ground hypothesis.
Perry’s critique of the common ground or neutral ground paradigm for moral-political 
justification centers on two crucial concepts. First, a paradigm that proposes to be neutral 
and impartial in fact is neither; it favors common ground beliefs over disputed beliefs. 
Second, the exclusion of disputed moral premises is unnecessarily restrictive. In the 
words of Perry:
A practice of political justification from which disputed beliefs about 
human good are excluded lacks the normative resources required for 
addressing our most fundamental political-moral questions .... Only a 
politics in which beliefs about human good, including disputed beliefs, 
have a central place is capable of addressing such issues (42).
Perry argues therefore, an individual’s most compelling beliefs, those core values that
define the ultimate meanings of life and give import to how one defines the good and
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fitting life, may in fact reside in the sphere of disputed beliefs. To exclude these disputed 
beliefs as a general principle is an unconscionable burden on any citizen, certainly a 
citizen in a liberal democracy, a political system that defends an individual’s right to 
pursue life, liberty, and happiness, and defends such rights as freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, and freedom o f religion. As did Galston, Perry argues that there is a 
presumed ontology in secularism that leads to a conclusion about “the good and fitting 
life”. To accept one conception of the good while rejecting another in fact violates the 
liberal principle of state neutrality on conceptions of the good.
Like Perry, Greenawalt also challenges “the thesis that political decisions should be 
made on naturalistic, nonreligious publicly accessible grounds.” He specifically 
castigates Ackerman for his “less than enthusiastic sympathy with religious 
perspectives.” He argues that a liberal democracy should not tell citizens how or on 
what basis moral premises should be informed. In other words, how I get to my moral 
premises is my business and a product of individual freedom not to be restricted by well 
meaning moral-political philosophers (55).
Greenawalt argues that many moral-political issues are complex and defy resolution
by shared common premises and publicly accessible reasons, especially in light of the
growing diversity of American society. In those instances Greenawalt posits:
A good argument exists that a person’s reliance on religious grounds 
should be regarded as appropriate if everyone must inevitably use 
“nonpublic” reasons of some sort or other. I do not rely on any claim that 
depriving public decisions of religiously based understanding will result in 
bad laws and policies, impoverished political dialogue, or undermine the 
stability of law and government. Rather my argument is based on simple 
notions of fairness and tolerance of diverse beliefs ... .If all people must 
draw from their personal experiences and commitments of values to some 
degree, people whose experience leads them to religious convictions
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should not have to disregard what they consider the critical insights about 
value that their convictions provide (144-145).
Greenawalt raises three possible critiques of his premise raised by opponents to his
position. The first critique simply contends that rational arguments always have
something to say in moral-political debate; rational arguments are not inconclusive in
moral-political debate. Greenawalt responds to this critique in a straightforward manner.
Although publicly accessible reasons may have something to say about all moral
premises, it does not necessarily follow that those contributions are conclusive. As an
example, how does one answer the question: do worms have a higher moral status than
dolphins in animal rights issues? It is Greenawalt’s sense that scientific naturalism can
be inconclusive (146-147). A second critique makes the point: a comprehensive ethical
paradigm such as utilitarianism can be used to resolve the issues when public accessible
reasons are inconclusive and prove to be inadequate to resolve specific moral-political
issues. Greenawalt responds, in a culture as diverse and pluralistic as American society,
people don’t agree on any one ethical paradigm. A third critique argues that religious
based grounds are distinguishable from other personal based grounds and religious
convictions are improper while other personal based grounds are not improper.
According to Greenawalt, this critique fails to appreciate the difficulty of separating
individual beliefs informed by religious convictions and beliefs informed by other
personal beliefs. He writes:
To demand that many devout Catholics, Protestants, and Jews pluck out 
their religious convictions is to ask them how they would think about a 
critical moral problem if they started from scratch, disregarding what they 
presently take as basic premises of moral thought. Asking that people 
perform this exercise is not only unrealistic in the sense impossible; the 
implicit demand that people compartmentalize beliefs that constitute some 
kind of unity in their approach to life is positively objectionable (155).
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I believe this explicit demand is objectionable to Greenawalt because in a very real sense 
this imposition on one’s ethical paradigm is intolerant of individual autonomy. This 
imposition violates a sacred tenant o f political liberalism.
There is an apparent contradiction in the arguments of Perry and Greenawalt. They 
both validate the necessity of translating religious based moral beliefs into a commonly 
understood terminology. Greenawalt writes, “The common currency of political 
discourse is nonreligious argument about human welfare. Public discourse about political 
issues with those who do not share religious premises should be cast in other than 
religious terms (217).” Perry likewise argues, for a religious argument to be legitimate in 
moral-political justification, it must find a common ground of authoritative truth 
amenable to all audiences and identify a public purpose or public good. Perry advocates 
a common ground between people with different beliefs, values, and concepts of the 
common good. The moral-political discourse should focus on those behaviors that 
private and community experience indicate make a human grow and mature and flourish 
(111). I am not sure how they differentiate the necessity of a nonreligious argument from 
Ackerman’s “neutral dialogue”, or Nagel’s and Richards’ overlapping moral consensus, 
or Audis’ reasons accepted by all. They seem to be saying the very same thing. 
Regardless of a person’s starting point for moral premises, religious or otherwise, public 
debate concerning the justification for coercive law must be grounded on reasons 
accepted and accessible to all. Rawls, Ackerman, Nagle, and Richards have consistently 
argued this very point.
Perry also responds to the argument raised earlier in this paper by Hammond and 
Richards. They argued that a moral-political paradigm that includes religious convictions
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as a justification for legislation violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
Perry contends that there is a difference between forcing people to adapt a religious faith 
system and justifying moral premises as a justification for law upon religious arguments. 
Religious arguments and justification for law that meet the criteria for admission to the 
public debate would not make them unconstitutional anymore than any moral premise 
would be unconstitutional because of its source. Perry argues that in regard to the 
establishment clause, courts have interpreted the establishment clause to mean simply 
that laws must have a secular purpose. His point, “Coercive legislation is virtually 
always based (in part, at least) on a belief that the prohibited way o f acting or living 
involves either physical or psychological harm (or both), whether to persons who live or 
act the prohibited way, to other persons or entities, or to both (115).” As has already 
been stated, the embittered nature o f moral-political debate often centers upon divergent 
interpretations of what constitutes “physical harm” or “psychological harm.”
The bottom line according to Perry, laws based on any rationale, religious or 
otherwise, that fail to meet the standard of “physical harm” or “psychological harm”, are 
equally invalid. In other words, religious-moral premises that meet the criteria of 
providing publicly intelligible and accessible reasons would in fact establish secular 
reasons for legislation that courts have recognized as valid and Constitutional; therefore, 
an interpretation of the First Amendment establishment clause does not proscribe 
religious based moral premises as a justification for legislation as long the religious 
premise is not the sole justification; it would even allow the religious premise to be the 
primary justification.
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In a similar vein, Greenawalt argues that religious convictions as a justification for 
moral premises should be included along with other personal methods and ethical 
paradigms in the public debate. To exclude religious convictions as a general principle is 
both intolerant and illiberal in a moral and ethically diverse society. The specific 
conditions that constitute a proper role for religious convictions in moral-political 
discourse arise when common premises and accessible forms of reasoning prove to be 
inconclusive in the resolution o f value judgments as the affect laws and public policy. He 
concludes, “Even though a model of our liberal democracy includes a limited 
commitment to shared bases of evaluation, it leaves considerable room for religious 
citizens to rely on religious grounds for moral judgments that affect law and public policy 
(216).”
Perry, Greenawalt, and Walterstorff clearly are at odds with the “strong view” 
as defined by Audi, but share much in common with the views of Audi,
Hammond, Richards, and even Rawls as defined by the “weaker view”. They 
agree that a person’s religious, and non-religious convictions, can properly inform 
political choices, but maintain that there is a responsibility in a liberal democracy 
to appeal to some common ground moral premise, or at the very least, to some 
derivative of Mill’s harm principle. Some constraints upon religious convictions 
as a justification for coercive law is a commonly accepted premise. The debate 
centers upon the extent and nature of such constraints.
Court Cases on Obscenity Law Jurisprudence
Up to this point, I have discussed the proper role of religious convictions as a 
theoretical question, the domain of the moral-political philosopher. I will now consider 
the same question inside a concrete moment of American history. I turn to four important 
court cases involving obscenity laws. These will serve as the primary resource for 
exploring the proper role of religious convictions in moral-political discourse, with 
application to the wider question of ethics, how ought we to order our lives together.
They are as follows: Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966), Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and Paris 
Adult Theatre 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
These court cases turn on three crucial questions: (1) can the state and federal 
government legislate coercive restraints upon access and distribution of material deemed 
obscene (and to what degree)? (2) Does any such constraint violate the First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of press? (3) What objective 
standard or criteria can be applied to evaluate what constitutes obscene material? To 
these three questions, an additional question has been raised as part of a feminist 
argument: do some forms of obscenity subordinate women and therefore provide a 
foundation for legal restrictions based on issues of equality?21
21 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory o f State.
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Questions that guided my research included: how did the judges explicitly justify their 
decisions? What are the possible implicit justifications? What principles of liberal 
democracy guided their decisions? Were religious convictions explicitly excluded? Were 
the decisions reflective of conflict and compromise or o f unanimity?
I begin with Roth v. United States 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This case also involved 
Albert v. United States. The Supreme Court argued and decided these two cases 
together. The central issue in both cases focused on “the constitutionality of a criminal 
obscenity statue (Roth 479).” Private citizens in both cases challenged the obscenity 
statue on the basis of the First Amendment rights o f free speech and freedom of the press. 
For the purpose of my research, I am concerned only with the judge’s explicit and 
implicit justifications for their decisions. I do not intend to provide any detailed 
discussion on the resolution of the cases.
The Roth decision is a benchmark in obscenity case jurisprudence because it 
articulates a definition of obscenity and establishes three criteria to guide court decisions. 
’Justice Brennon provides this definition of obscenity: material is lewd and obscene if “to 
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest (Roth 489).” Under this definition, 
as elaborated in subsequent cases since Roth, three elements must coalesce to determine 
if materials are deemed obscene. These are as follows:
(1) The dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests.
(2) The material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary standards 
relating to the description or representation of sexual matters.
(3) The material is utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs 418).
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The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Brennon, defends the states right to enact 
obscenity laws, deciding that the First Amendment protection of free speech does not 
extend to material deemed to be obscene. The arguments justifying coercive obscenity 
laws in the majority opinion follow four main contours: (1) historical precedent, (2) harm 
to social fabric, (3) harm to other individuals, and (4) appeal to community moral 
consensus. I will consider each argument in order along with the dissenting view.
Justice Brennon, writing the majority opinion, argues from a historical precedent as 
reflected in “the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the 
international agreement of over fifty nations, in the obscenity laws of all o f the forty- 
eight states, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from 1842 to 1956 (Roth 
485).” Justice Warren concurs when he writes: “there is a social problem” reflected in 
the laws enacted in forty-eight states as well as Congress (Roth 495). He adds a word of 
caution when he acknowledges that there have been historical mistakes that improperly 
encroached on free speech. Because of past mistakes, he believes the court should decide 
with humility and legal restraint; just because there is a problem does not justify any or 
all measures to rectify.
Justice Harlan in dissent states, “In the final analysis, the problem presented by these 
cases is how far, and on what terms, the state and federal government have power to 
punish individuals for disseminating books considered to be undesirable because of their 
nature or supposed deleterious effect upon human conduct (Roth 496-497).” He argues 
that any constraint upon particular material is an individual matter not to be decided by 
the courts. Justice Harlan’s initial response to the majority opinion simply articulates a
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deeply held liberal principle and tradition traced through Locke and Mill: the right for 
each individual to choose in matters of conscience.
Justice Brennon, speaking for the majority, appeals to a historical precedent both 
internationally and in the United States, in short, past national and international 
consensus implies a current justification for obscenity laws. In context, no rationale is 
provided for past precedence in obscenity law. Certainly in his appeal to historical 
precedent, Justice Brennon makes no explicit appeal or reference to religious convictions 
as a basis for past obscenity laws, but it is fair to raise the question: were past obscenity 
laws justified in part based upon religious convictions? I only suggest it would be 
difficult to separate moral premises based upon religious convictions from moral 
premises based on reasons accessible to all, certainly in the context of judicial history. 
Robert Audi raises this as an issue in his article “77ze Place o f Religious Argument in a 
Free and Democratic Society”. In his definition of a religious argument, he includes 
those moral premises that can be traced back to a historical link that is religious in nature 
(Audi Religious Arguments 683). In this light, the appeal Justice Brennon and Justice 
Warren make to historical precedence could result in a connection between coercive law 
and religious conviction, although this is certainly not their intent.
A second argument advanced by Justice Brennon concerns the moral fabric of society 
and supports a communitarian argument. He quotes the judgment expressed in 
Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 5-1—572, “It has been observed that such 
utterances [lewd and obscene]... are of such slight social value... any benefit that my be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality 
(Roth 485).” Emphasis mine. Chief Justice Warren echoes this same sentiment when he
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agrees with the California courts that obscenity has a substantial tendency to corrupt 
(Roth 494).
It is interesting to note that although Justice Harlan dissented in the Roth decision, he
concurred in the Albert decision. In the second case, Harlan agreed that the state could
enforce obscenity laws that involved unsolicited distribution of material deemed obscene.
He writes, “the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of the home
against an invasion of unsolicited obscenity (Roth 502). What I find to be of particular
interest is a statement that seems inconsistent with his earlier comment defending
individual liberty of conscience from state intrusion. He writes:
It seems to me clear that it is not irrational, in our present state of 
knowledge, to consider that pornography can induce a type of sexual 
conduct which a state may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of 
society... .The state can reasonable draw the inference that over a long 
period of time the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential 
character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral 
standards (Roth 501).
In fairness to Justice Harlan, I want to place this quotation within context. He is not
defending the right of the state to decide what is lewd and obscene to individuals. He
believes this to be a matter of personal conscience. Instead, he defends the state’s right to
constrain unsolicited distribution of questionable material. Though he recognizes there
may be a public harm such as an erosion of moral standards, he does not consider this
sufficient justification for coercive constraints upon individual liberty and conscience.
John Locke and John Stuart Mill would disagree on this same point. Locke argues 
that “no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules necessary to the 
preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate... such things as 
undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the judgment of
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all mankind (Locke Toleration 61).” Mill argues, in contrast to Locke, that liberty 
comprises:
First, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of 
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense, absolute freedom of opinion 
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or 
theological... .Secondly, the principle [of liberty] requires liberty of tastes 
and pursuits; of framing the plan of life to suit our own character; of doing 
as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without 
impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not 
harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, 
or wrong (15).
The crucial question raised by the justices in the Roth case and implicit in both Locke and 
Mill is this: what constitutes harm for others? Certainly Justice Brennon’s argument is 
consistent with a Lockean understanding of moral-political discourse: moral rules 
necessary to the preservation of civil society are legitimate concerns of the community 
and can be enforced by law.
This brings us to a third argument. Justice Brennon explicitly appeals to the harm 
principle as a justification for obscenity laws; however, he does not believe there must be 
conclusive evidence of a causal connection between obscenity and harm to others. He 
writes, “Convictions may be had without proof either that obscene material will 
perceptibly create a clear and present danger of anti-social behavior (Roth 486).” In 
other words, convictions alone are sufficient grounds for coercive laws without 
conclusive demonstrative proof of any perceived harm. I raise the question: what is the 
basis for such convictions? Can such convictions be based upon religious convictions? 
And again, how would one separate religious conviction from secular convictions? This 
is the issue Kent Greenawalt raises in his book Religious Convictions in Political Choice.
He argues that it is difficult for the average citizen to separate which of their views are 
shaped by religious convictions and which are based on rational criteria (44).
Justice Harlan does not challenge the harm principle, that is, harm to others can be 
constrained by law. He does however disagree with laws grounded in only the perception 
of social harm: “The assumption seems to be that the distribution of certain types of 
literature will induce criminal or immoral behavior (Roth 501).” This is an assumption 
that, according to Justice Harlan, sociologist, psychiatrists and penologists are in sharp 
disagreement about. Justice Douglas and Justice Black are even more explicit in their 
dissent on this issue. They believe it is wrong to punish thoughts provoked rather than 
for overt acts and anti-social behavior. Justice Douglas writes, “to allow the state to step 
in and punish mere speech or publication that the judge thinks has an undesirable impact 
on thoughts but that is not shown to be a part of unlawful action is drastically to curtail 
the First Amendment (Roth 509).” He further writes, “if we were certain that impurity of 
sexual thoughts impelled to action, we would be on less dangerous ground in punishing 
the distributors of this sex literature (Roth 510).”
Neither the majority nor dissenting judges disagree on the harm principle. There is 
general agreement that if the expression of individual thought or action harms another 
person, and there is conclusive evidence that a causal relationship exists, then law is a 
legitimate response. The judges disagree on the nature o f evidence necessary to justify 
law. Justice Brennon defends convictions without proof; Justice Douglas defends 
convictions based upon reasons accessible to all. Both viewpoints implicitly allow 
religious convictions to serve as a partial justification for law. From justice Brennon’s 
viewpoint, the justification for the conviction that obscenity causes a public harm could
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be “veiled” religious convictions at the very least. From Justice Douglas’s position, 
religious conviction could be the most compelling reason in a citizens or judges mind, but 
other evidence for a public harm would be required. In his view, religious convictions 
could not stand alone as a justification for law.
Justice Brennon, speaking for the majority, raises another controversial argument to 
defend the court’s decision. In his definition of obscenity, he alludes to “contemporary 
community standards.” Quoting the trial lawyer, he writes, “You must ask yourselves 
does it offend the common conscience of the community by present-day standards”. He 
further quotes the specific words spoken to the jury by the trial judge: “In this case, ladies 
and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive judges of what the 
common conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience, you are to 
consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the 
religious and irreligious -  men, women, and children (Roth 490).”
In the state case, the jury served as a proxy moral conscience for the entire 
community, a position that Justice Douglas finds troubling in his dissent. He writes, “any 
test that turns on what is offensive to the community is too loose, too capricious.” He 
further writes, “I can understand (and at times even sympathize) with programs of civic 
groups and church groups to protect and defend existing moral standards of the 
community... when speech alone is involved... I do not think the government, consistent 
with the First Amendment, can throw its weight behind one school or another (Roth 
512).”
I hear components of both the thought of Mill and Rawls in the reticence of Justice 
Douglas. In the words of Justice Douglas, I hear the echo of Mill: “there needs protection
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also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of 
society to impose by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules 
of conduct on those who dissent from them (Mill 8).” I hear also a prophetic anticipation 
of Rawls’s Theory o f  Justice when he writes about the priority of the individual right of 
free speech over the priority of the good of the social moral-fabric. He also defends state 
neutrality between concepts of the good. I realize of course that Justice Douglas is 
writing in 1957 and Rawls’s Theory o f  Justice is published over fifteen years later. It is 
clear that conceptions of liberal principles as a priority in justifying law and state 
neutrality on conceptions o f the good life, are embedded in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Douglas long before Rawls publishes his seminal work.
The concept of laws based on community moral consensus, certainly raises some 
critical questions. What are the grounds for community moral consensus? Is community 
moral consensus tied to religious convictions? I am not far off base when I posit, time 
and location would greatly influence the answer. There would be a great diversity of 
opinion among a jury consisting of citizens from Alma, Arkansas (home of my parents); 
or Salt Lake City, Utah; or Boston, Massachusetts. Justice Harlan recognizes this 
community and state diversity when he writes: “Congress has no power over sexual 
morality... [it is] the states, which bear direct responsibility for the protection of the local 
moral fabric (Roth 504).”
The judges articulate clearly in the court records of Roth v. United States a sharp 
disagreement over the rights and interests of the individual and the community. The 
court records reflect no explicit appeal to religious convictions as a proper justification 
for obscenity laws; however, the concepts of judicial precedent, community moral
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consensus, and perceived public harm permit an implicit justification for religious 
convictions to play an active role in shaping and defining individual values and public 
discourse.
I next consider Memoirs v. Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413 (1966). The Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts concluded that the book Memoirs o f  a Woman ofPleasure (Fanny Hill) 
was obscene and thereby not protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed the state decision. The majority opinion 
concluded that the State Supreme Court failed to properly interpret the third criteria for 
defining obscenity as articulated in Roth v. United States. The third criterion qualifies 
material deemed lewd and obscene as “utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs 
418).”
This case takes on added significance because o f a view expressed by Justice Clark. 
He argued in the dissent that the phrase “utterly without redeeming social value” opened 
a Pandora’s box for obscenity legislation because any material could be thinly veiled as 
art, history, or literature. He argued for a standard that was subsequently established in 
Miller v. United States.
In Miller the third criteria defining obscene material was changed from “utterly 
without redeeming social value” to “whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or social value (Miller 39).” The book in question described 
the life of a woman trapped in a life of prostitution until, at the end of the book, she 
escapes prostitution and marries her true love. The great body of the text is a drama of 
descriptive sexual expression considered by many to be deviant and obscene. According 
to Justice Brennon, the sole issue before the court was, “whether Memoirs satisfies the
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test o f obscenity established in Roth v. United States (Memoirs 418).” He believed that 
sufficient expert witness had argued that the book in question did have literary merit and 
historical value. The book could not be deemed obscene and censored under 
Massachusetts law because it was not utterly without redeeming social value (Memoirs 
422-423).
Justice Douglas, concurred with the majority opinion, but he did so on the basis of 
arguments he advanced in Roth v. United States. He writes, “I base my vote to reverse 
on my view that the first Amendment does not permit the censorship of expression not 
brigaded with illegal action (Memoirs 426).” Douglas believes censorship to be the most 
notorious violation of free speech because “it substitutes majority rule where minority 
tastes or viewpoints were to be tolerated (Memoirs 427).” Douglas defends his position 
on a liberal principle that greatly values the protection of individual thought and 
expression in matters of conscience. He vehemently challenges the communitarian 
argument that obscenity should be censored to protect community interests. He writes, 
“publications and utterances were made immune from majoritarian control by the First 
Amendment, applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. No exceptions were 
made, not even for obscenity (Memoirs 428).” He further adds, “The censor is always 
quick to justify his action in terms that are protective o f society” and believes the 
argument that obscenity results in anti-social behavior is inconclusive (Memoirs 431).
Justice Clark offers an interesting point in dissent, “to say that social value may 
‘redeem’ implies that courts must balance alleged esthetic merit against harmful 
consequences that may flow from pornography (Memoirs 451).” He argues, though there 
is a diversity of opinion among experts, there are strong voices suggesting a correlation
56
between criminal, anti-social behavior and pornography. Such danger of harm 
constitutes a rationale for laws to constrain the proliferation of obscene material 
(Memoirs 452). He writes, “Congress and legislatures o f every state have enacted 
measures to restrict the distribution of erotic and pornographic material, justifying these 
controls by reference to evidence that anti-social behavior may result in part from reading 
obscenity (Memoirs 453).” He cites several court cases in which free speech was limited 
based upon public welfare: Schneider v. State, 308 United States U.S. 147; Scheneck v. 
United States 249 U.S. 47,52; United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201,201; just to name a 
few. Justice Clark believes states should retain flexibility in determining matters of 
obscenity as it relates to matters o f public welfare (Memoirs 458).
Once again in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, there is no explicit reference to religious 
convictions as a basis for obscenity laws. The conflict continues to emerge between the 
interests of individual rights and community welfare. Justice Douglas is a strong 
proponent of an absolute right to free speech. In contrast, Justice Clarke is concerned 
with community welfare. The dispute centers on each judge’s concept of the harm 
principle. Does pornographic material constitute a harm to other individuals and society, 
or is it just a personal matter of choice with no inherent dangers? A strong proponent of 
absolute right to free speech would decry any effort to limit freedom o f expression that 
appeals to a public harm, especially if such harm is tied to a majoritarian religious 
conviction. A strong proponent of the community right to protect the moral fabric of 
society could appeal to the perceived harm of pornography, a perception that may in fact 
be informed by religious moral premises.
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Next I consider Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973). As mentioned earlier, this 
case establishes a new standard for evaluating obscenity cases because it rejects “utterly 
without redeeming social value” as a constitutional standard for defining obscenity. The 
United States Supreme Court upheld a California decision that the appellant could be 
convicted for mailing unsolicited sexually explicit material in violation of California 
obscenity laws. The California statue was based upon the obscenity test articulated in 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts in the plurality opinion. Unique to this case, sexually explicit 
materials were aggressively thrust upon unwilling recipients through the mail (Miller 18).
The Miller decision established three key principles that serve as criteria in obscenity 
case jurisprudence: (1) the application of contemporary community standards; (2) 
material must be patently offensive in depicting sexual act; and (3) must, as a whole, lack 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value (Miller 39).
Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, acknowledges, “No majority of the 
court has at any given time been able to determine what constitutes obscene, 
pornographic material subject to regulation under the States police power (Miller 22).”
He does believe however that the following two principles have been categorically settled 
by the courts: (1) obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, and (2) the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes (Miller 23).” 
Chief Justice Burger offers a contrasting opinion to the view articulated by Douglas in 
Memoirs. He does not interpret the free exercise clause as an absolute freedom as stated 
by Douglas: “publications and utterances were made immune from majoritarian control 
by the First Amendment, applicable to the states by reason of the Fourteenth. No 
exceptions were made, not even for obscenity (Memoirs 428).”
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Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, attempts to establish a more 
concrete and detailed definition of obscene material by citing specific examples of 
inappropriate material. The majority opinion defines obscene material as “patently 
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated (Miller 25).” They take one additional step, attempting to articulate 
“concrete guidelines to isolate ‘hardcore’ pornography from expression protected by the 
First Amendment (Miller 29).”
The court also affirmed the judicial precedent established in Roth and Memoirs 
agreeing that the application o f “contemporary standards of the state of California... is 
constitutionally adequate” to provide a community definition of obscene material (Miller 
34). Justice Burger responds to the dissenting contention that there should be a national 
standard defining obscenity. Instead, he argues that each society has the right to decide 
on a community definition o f obscenity instead of a nationally imposed standard (Miller 
33-34). It is important to notice, the court affirms the concept of a community standard 
of obscenity in contrast to a purely individual standard. This seems to violate a cherished 
principle o f the family of liberal positions as articulated by Mill and Rawls, the right for 
the individual to decide in matters of morals and conscience and the rejection o f a 
coercive majoritarian community standard.
Notably absent in Miller is a discussion of the harm principle. Neither the majority 
nor the dissenting opinion attempt to justify or challenge coercive laws on the basis of the 
Mill’s harm principle. The central issue argued is simply the constitutional right of the 
community to establish some minimal moral standards enforced by law, a Lockean and 
communitarian argument.
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The summary of the majority opinion follows: “we (a) reaffirm the Roth holding that
obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment; (b) hold that such material can
be regulated by the states... without showing that the material is ‘utterly without
redeeming social value’; and (c) hold that obscenity is to be determined by ‘applying
contemporary community standards...not national standards’ (Miller 37).”
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, is offended by what he considers the new and
changing standards used to define obscenity:
Today we would add a new three-pronged test: (a) whether the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards would find the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests,...(b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value. These are standards we ourselves have written into the constitution 
(Miller 39).
He further states, “The idea that the First Amendment permits the government to ban 
publications that are ‘offensive’ to some people puts an ominous gloss on freedom of the 
press ... to give the power to censor, as we do today, is to make a sharp and radical break 
with the traditions of a free society (Miller 44).”
Once again the court makes no explicit appeal to religious moral-premises as a 
justification for coercive laws. I believe this to be a consistent confirmation that, in 
American legal culture, at least since World War Two, an explicit appeal to religious 
conviction is improper as a sole justification for law. However, I still raise the question: 
how does society shape and develop a contemporary community standard? For some 
individuals, their conception of moral standards on matters of conscience will be 
informed by religious belief and convictions, convictions difficult to separate into 
religious and secular.
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I consider another important case concerned with obscenity laws, Paris Adult Theatre 
v. Slanton 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The Petitioners sued the respondents under Georgia civil 
law, challenging the showing of two adult movies considered by the petitioners to be 
obscene. The United States Supreme Court upheld the Georgia state law, which set 
constraints upon the public viewing of “hard core” pornography.
Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. His argument follows five contours that I 
will briefly trace. The majority opinion once again affirms that pornography is not 
protected under the First Amendment because the constitution does not grant unlimited 
freedom to “consenting adults”. The second argument appeals to a concern for 
community welfare. Justice Burger writes, “we hold that there are legitimate state 
interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercial obscenity, even assuming it is 
feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and passerby (Paris 
57-58).” He further argues that the interest of the public “in the quality of life and total 
community, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public 
safety itself’ justifies constraints upon the public viewing of pornography (Paris 58). He 
quotes expert witness, Professor Bickel, who testified “what is commonly read and seen 
and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it, or not (Paris 59).”
A third argument contends legislators are not required to justify coercive laws on 
undisputed scientific data. Justice Burger writes, “Although there is no conclusive proof 
of a connection between anti-social behavior and obscene material, the legislature of 
Georgia could quite reasonably determine that such a connection does or might exist 
(Paris 61).” He argues that, in fact, such assumptions underlie much lawful state 
regulation.
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He next challenges a strong, “absolutist” conception of a constitutional right to 
untrammeled freedom of action. He writes, “Most exercises o f individual free choice -  
those in public politics, religion, and expression of ideas -  are explicitly protected by the 
Constitution. Totally unlimited play for free will, however, is not allowed in our or any 
other society (Paris 64)”. With this statement, he acknowledges the inherent tension 
between liberty and law, indivual rights and community interests.
Justice Burger next responds to the contention that the right to privacy entails 
protected access to obscene material by consenting adults. He simply writes that the 
private home is not the same as the public square and that “the issue in this context goes 
beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as 
‘wrong’ or ‘sinful’. The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that 
public exhibition of obscene material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, 
to endanger the public safety (Paris 64).”
This last argument deserves closer scrutiny because it raises some issues not discussed 
thus far. His statement seems to imply that the concept of wrong or sinful in the minds of 
some is disputed ground as a justification for constraint. Justice Burger further speaks of 
a morally neutral judgment, Morally neutral in what sense? I believe he is expressing the 
principle o f state neutrality on conceptions o f the good. Instead of defending a particular 
conception of right or wrong, he justifies obscenity law based upon the harm principle. 
Behavior may be constrained if it is deemed injurious to the community and may 
endanger public safety.
Justice Douglas, once again writing in dissent, affirms the liberal principle of 
individual autonomy in all matters of opinion and conscience:
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When man was first in the jungle he took care o f himself. When he 
entered a societal group, controls were necessarily imposed. But our 
society, unlike most in the world -  presupposes that freedom and liberty 
are a frame of reference that makes the individual, not the government, the 
keeper of the tastes, beliefs, and ideas. That is the philosophy of the First 
Amendment; it is the article of faith that sets us apart from most nations in 
the world (Paris 73).
His basic argument is twofold: (1) there is no clear, consensual conception defining 
obscenity, and (2) obscenity laws are arbitrary encroachments on free speech and 
thought; therefore, there is “no definable class of sexually oriented expression that may 
be totally suppressed by the Federal and State Government (Paris 103).”
It is consistent with the decisions of the judges in the court cases I considered to 
conclude that moral-political discourse in America excludes explicit religious convictions 
as the sole justification for coercive law. The justification for obscenity laws, without 
exception, appealed to the concept of a “public harm” and a “community moral 
consensus” independent o f religious based moral-premises. Now comes the difficulty, 
for some citizens, an understanding of public harm and community moral consensus may 
very well be closely tied to religious convictions. Separating religious convictions from 
secular convictions may be impossible; and, even if this separation could be 
accomplished, should this be a requirement of voting citizens in a liberal democracy?
The proper role of religious convictions in moral-political discourse is not so easily 
settled; I believe current political-culture reflects disagreement rather than unanimity.
Conclusion
It is time to draw some conclusions concerning the proper role of religious convictions 
as a justification for coercive laws in American society. The issue I have raised reflects 
several areas of disagreement in American culture as follows: (1) there is disagreement 
on if and how religious convictions should enter the arena of public debate and 
justification for law; (2) The Enlightenment goal of establishing a conclusive rational 
foundation for morality apart from an appeal to higher authority is far from resolved for 
many American citizens; (3) citizens, philosophers, politicians, and judges disagree on 
the meaning and application o f Mill’s harm principle to law; (4) contemporary American 
social and political culture maintains a high commitment to individual freedom and a 
wariness of any state or majoritarian violation of autonomy, still, there is an unresolved 
tension between individual rights and community interests
I conclude with an assertion made by' Alisdair MacIntyre: laws reveal conflicts in 
society and are indicative o f unresolved and conflicted interests rather than an expression 
of commonly shared values and beliefs. He argues that the “function of the Supreme 
Court must be to keep peace between rival social groups adhering to rival and 
incompatible principles o f justice by displaying a fairness which consists in even- 
handedness in its adjudications (253).” He further states, “The nature of any society... is 
not deciphered from its laws alone, but from those understood as an index of its conflicts 
(254). Academic debate, public discourse, public policy makers, and judges will
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continue to grapple with the complex relationship between church and state, specifically, 
the proper role of religious conviction in shaping and informing individual choices and 
public policy as it pertains to coercive laws. America continues to be a nation in which a
■j ' j
great number of its citizens express a belief in God and maintain that the great ethical 
question, how should we order our lives together, cannot be divorced from a belief in 
“divine truth,” although there is a reticence to imposing such beliefs on other citizens by 
force of law. At the same time, there remains a strong “secular” current in society that 
defends a strong separation between church and state and maintains that public debate 
and public polity should exclude, as a general principle, religious belief and conviction. 
Religion should be regulated to private life and practice. In a liberal democracy that 
attempts (certainly imperfectly) to give each citizen a voice, a policy of compromise 
between the more radical positions on this issue is the most likely outcome. Citizens with 
strong religious convictions about the way life should be ordered in our society will 
continue a heated debate with those citizens who hold strong secular convictions about 
the way life should be ordered. Each will claim victim status and appeal to the courts to 
resolve complicated issues involving church and state relationships. I believe the courts 
will remain busy interpreting and applying the religious clauses of the First Amendment 
to issues of contemporary public debate.
22 Alan Wolfe in his essay, Civil Religion Revisited: Quiet Faith in Middle-Class America, comments that 
although 94 percent o f Americans express a belief in God, they are reticent to impose their own beliefs 
about right and wrong on others. Tolerance of other points o f view is a commonly embraced value in 
middle-class America (57). Wolfe is Professor o f Sociology and political-Science at Boston University.
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